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a	small	machine.	Whether	larger	machines	
could	 throw	 mines	 even	 greater	 distances	
than	the	maximum	seen	here	of	65	metres	
remains	 to	 be	 tested,	 as	 throw	 distance	 is	
a	 function	 of	 length	 of	 chain,	 design	 of	
chain	head,	speed	of	rotation,	and	amount	
of	protection	around	the	flail	head.	Larger	
machines	have	longer	chains	but	may	use	a	
slower	rotation	speed.
This	flail	 tended	to	throw	mines	 to	the	
right.	Given	that	it	is	impossible	to	prevent	
throw	completely,	it	might	be	possible	to	ad-
just	 the	action	of	 the	 chains	 and	design	of	
the	 deflector	 plate	 to	 force	 an	 even	 higher	
proportion	 of	 throw	 to	 one	 side.	Whether	
the	 laterality	of	 throw	is	a	characteristic	of	
this	individual	flail	or	of	the	model	generally	
does	not	matter.	What	matters	 is	that	with	
laterality	of	throw	known,	the	machine	can	
be	deployed	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	main	direc-
tion	of	 throw	 is	 into	 areas	 that	 are	not	 yet	
processed.	For	example,	this	machine	would	
be	best	deployed	either	in	a	clockwise	direc-
tion	from	the	perimeter	of	the	minefield,	or	
an	anti-clockwise	direction	from	the	centre.	
With	 respect	 to	mine	 throw,	working	back	
and	forth	along	parallel	lines	would	not	be	a	
good	way	to	use	this	machine.	
Soil	 type	was	 the	primary	 factor	deter-
mining	throw	patterns.	Mine	size	and	depth	
were	relatively	unimportant.	The	depth	set-
ting	of	the	flail	is	likely	to	affect	some	val-
ues	in	the	data,	but	the	overall	trends	found	
for	mine	size	and	depth	should	be	similar.	
Clearly,	more	 tests	 of	 this	 sort	 on	 dif-
ferent	 makes	 and	 sizes	 of	 flails	 are	 desir-
able.	The	Geneva	International	Centre	for	
Humanitarian	Demining	plans	to	continue	
these	tests,	but	the	manufacturers	can	also	
conduct	 tests	 so	 they	 can	 give	 advice	 to	
purchasers	 on	 laterality	 of	 throw,	 propor-
tion	of	mines	thrown	beyond	the	flail,	and	
likely	maximum	throw	distance	under	dif-
ferent	operating	conditions.	Consideration	
should	 be	 given	 to	 including	 information	
about	 throw	 patterns	 in	 the	 Mechanical 
Demining Equipment Catalogue,	 and	even-
tually	 to	 developing	 a	 standard	 test	 to	 be	
incorporated	 into	 the	 International	 Mine	
Action	Standards.
We thank the Swedish EOD and 
Demining Centre for supplying equipment, 
resources and the field site to support the 
study. Funding was provided by the govern-
ments of Germany, Norway and Sweden. 
See Endnotes, page 112 T
he	MineWolf	is	a	mine-clearing	device	developed	especially	for	
humanitarian	mine-clearance.	 It	 is	 used	 for	 area	 clearing	 and	
clears	up	to	2,800	square	metres	per	hour	(3,349	square	yards/hour),	
allowing	 for	 fast	 quality	 control	 on	 a	 demined	 area.	The	MineWolf	
system	consists	of	a	fragment-proof	AHWI	crawler	tractor,	a	protected	
driver’s	 cab	 and	 a	mechanically	 driven	mine-clearing	 device.	Both	 a	
flail	device	and	a	tiller	are	available.	
The	flail	 is	 likely	 to	 initiate	 or	 destroy	 anti-tank	mines.	With	
the	tiller,	the	remains	of	AT	mines,	the	fuzes	and	all	AP	mines	left	
are	 crushed	 or	 initiated.	 Clearance	 depths	 of	 up	 to	 30	 centime-
tres	 (11.8	 inches)	 in	 the	
soil	are	achieved	with	the	
tiller.	Live	AT	mines,	in-
cluding	DM	21,	TM	57	
and	TM	621	mines,	have	
been	cleared.	
The	MineWolf	was	sub-
ject	 to	 extensive	 tests	 with	
live	anti-tank	mines,	under-
taken	 in	 Meppen,	 Lower	
Saxony,	 Germany,	 at	 the	
Army	proving	ground.	The	
tests	were	conducted	with	
a	fully	operational	MineWolf	using	both	types	of	mine-clearing	devices	
(i.e.,	flail	 and	 tiller).	The	vehicle	was	operated	by	both	 remote-	 and	
operator-control.	During	four	tests	an	instrumented	Anthropometric	
Test	Device	(fully	instrumented	test	dummy)	was	placed	on	the	driver’s	
seat.	The	measured	values	had	to	be	evaluated	to	view	possible	risks	to	
the	operator	during	mine	clearance.	
A	 total	 of	 six	 remote	 clearance	 tests	were	 conducted	 against	 live	
anti-tank	mines.	Four	of	these	tests	led	to	the	detonation	of	the	cleared	
AT	mines	and	thus	to	measurable	results	that	could	be	used	to	analyze	
the	damage	to	the	demining	tool	and	the	MineWolf.	Two	tests	each	
with	 the	 two	mine-clearing	 devices	 (flail	 and	 tiller)	were	 conducted	
against	one	DM	21	and	TM	57	AT	mine	each.	In	order	to	be	able	to	
rule	out	uncontrolled	movements	of	the	MineWolf,	it	was	secured	to	a	
recovery	tank	during	the	tests	by	a	steel	rope.	The	mines	to	be	cleared	
by	Heinz	Rath	and	Dieter	Schröder	[	MineWolf	Systems	GmbH	]	
MineWolf is the first demining concept, manufactured in Germany by Arthur Willibald Maschinenbau 
GmbH (AHWI), that overcomes the limitations of flail and tiller machines by combining the advantages 
of both systems. Extensive tests with live anti-tank and fragmentation mines were carried out at the 
German Army proving ground to determine whether the MineWolf meets the operational requirements 
for humanitarian demining. The aim was to discover the effects of detonations on the operator, 
MineWolf, clearing tools and cabin, and to work out instructions for reparability. 
were	laid	one	by	one	centrally	and	offset	in	front	of	the	clearing	device.	
After	a	detonation,	the	vehicle	was	stopped	immediately	and	the	effects	
were	documented.	If	required,	the	clearing	device	was	repaired	prior	to	
the	next	test	run.	
Test schedule. The	 testing	of	 the	method	and	 timing	were	 con-
ducted	in	the	following	order:
1.	 MineWolf	remote-control	tests	with	flail	and	tiller	and	a	fully	
instrumented	test	dummy	(ATD)
2.	 AT	mine	tests	(DM	21,	TM	57	and	TM	62)
3.	 Biomechanical	tests	with	an	ATD
4.	 MineWolf	 manned	 tests	 with	 flail	 and	 tiller	 using	 three	
different	operators	
5.	 Fragmentation	mine	tests	(DM	31)	
6.	 Tests	 with	 three	 detonations	 without	 repair	 to	 investigate	
quality	of	demining	operations
Figure	1:	The	MineWolf	in	action.	
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Figure	2:	A	fully	instrumented	dummy.
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Recording.	 Tests	 performed	 on	 the	
MineWolf	included	the	following:
•	 Video	recording	from	outside
•	 Video	recording	inside	the	driver's	cab
•	 Blast	 pressure	 measurement	 inside	
the	driver's	cab
•	 Acceleration	measurement	 inside	the	
driver's	cab
•	 Measurements	taken	by	the	ATD
•	 Pictures	of	damage	to	flail	and	tiller
•	 Pictures	of	flail	and	tiller	repaired
Remote-control Tests
Tests	performed	remotely	using	the	flail	
and	tiller	apparatuses	were	conducted	with	
AT	mines	TM	57	(6.5	kg	TNT),	TM	62	P3	
(6.5	kg	TNT)	and	DM	21	(5	kg	TNT).	
The	remote-control	tests	were	necessary	to	
record	the	physical	effects	and	potential	risks	
for	the	operator	and	MineWolf.	These	effects	
were	measured	by	means	of	an	instrumented	
test	dummy,	in	order	to	be	able	to	perform	a	
human-related	biomechanical	assessment.	
To	 record	 the	measured	values,	 an	ATD	
was	placed	on	the	driver’s	seat	and	was	fitted	
with	 various	 sensors	 to	 measure	 human-
relevant	impact	information.	
A	total	of	six	remote	clearing	tests	were	
conducted	 against	 live	AT	mines.	Four	of	
these	tests	led	to	the	detonation;	two	of	the	
mines	were	crushed.	Little	or	no	flail	repair	
work	 was	 necessary	 after	 the	 unmanned	
test.	Damage	 to	 the	 tiller	device	 is	 shown	
in	 Figures	 4	 and	 5.	The	 repairs	 shown	 in	
Figure	 6	 are	mainly	 welding	work,	 which	
could	be	performed	on-site	the	same	day.
Biomechanical Results2
The	remote-control	tests	were	a	necessary	
prerequisite	to	performing	the	manned	tests.	
The	results	of	the	biomechanical	assessment	
and	 the	 blast-pressure	 measurement	 had	 to	
rule	 out	 any	 hazard	 to	 the	 operator	 when	
clearing	live	anti-tank	mines.		
The	 results	 of	 the	 biomechanical	 mea-
surements	with	the	fully	instrumented	dum-
my	were	within	a	very	acceptable	range.	This	
statement	applies	 to	the	examined	AT	mine	
types	DM	21,	TM	57	and	TM	62	and	refers	
to	mine	detonations	that	occurred	in	the	area	
of	the	clearing	device.
The	assessment	of	the	blast	pressure	load	
in	the	driver’s	cab	showed	that	the	blast	pres-
sure	 load	is	very	low	in	the	cabin	and	dam-
age	to	the	ears	is	not	expected	if	adequate	ear	
protection	is	worn.	
In	summary,	it	can	be	stated	that	the	op-
erator	in	the	driver’s	cab	of	the	MineWolf	is	
not	subjected	to	an	intolerable	risk	of	injury	
by	the	explosion	of	a	DM	21	or	TM	57	anti-
tank	mine	 if	 the	mine	detonates	 in	the	area	
of	the	mine-clearing	device	(both	types	were	
successfully	detonated	during	 the	 test).	The	
risk	of	 injury	 is	 very	 low	and	 far	below	 the	
allowed	limits	for	mine-protected	vehicles	of	
the	German	Army,	which	are	based	on	inter-
national	standards.	Even	in	the	case	of	repeat-
ed	successive	loads,	no	serious	consequences	
are	expected.	Temporary	light	disturbances	like	headaches	or	muscular	
pain,	however,	cannot	be	excluded.
During	the	four	tests,	all	human-related	criteria	were	tested	to	the	
extent	that	they	could	be	evaluated.
Due	to	the	principle	of	operation	of	the	MineWolf,	the	detonation	
of	 a	mine	underneath	 the	vehicle	hull	or	 a	 track	during	mine-clear-
ing	is	not	very	likely	but	cannot	be	ruled	out.	Based	on	the	available	
measured	data,	 the	 effects	 that	 an	 explosion	underneath	 the	hull	 or	
a	track	would	have	on	the	vehicle	and	the	mounted	operator	cannot	
be	assessed.	It	 is	definitely	possible,	however,	that	this	would	lead	to	
critical	 loads.	 It	 is	 therefore	 recommended	 that	 these	cases	be	 inves-
tigated—e.g.,	detonation	underneath	the	vehicle	hull	or	a	track—by	
static	contact	detonation	tests	to	ensure	the	highest	degree	of	safety	for	
the	MineWolf	operator.	
Manned Tests 
Test	personnel	conducted	the	manned	tests	with	the	AT	mines	TM	
57	(6.5	kg	TNT)	and	TM	62	P3	(6.5	kg	TNT).	
Figure	3:	A	typical	mine	crater	after	clearing	a	TM	57	or	TM	62	AT	mine.
Figure	4:	Damage	after	clearing	TM	62	AT	mine.
	Figure	5:	Damage	after	clearing	TM	57	AT	mine.
	Figure	6:	Tiller	repaired. Figure	8:	Damage	after	clearing	a	TM	57	AT	mine.
As	 the	biomechanical	measurements	with	 the	 fully	 instrumented	
dummy	did	not	 show	 any	 risk,	manned	 tests	were	 approved	by	 the	
firing	controller.
Tests	were	tightened	by	clearing	mines	off-centre—detonation	
occurred	on	the	left-	or	right-hand	side	of	the	demining	tool	with	
both	flail	and	tiller—to	find	out	whether	the	drive	train	would	suf-
fer	 irreparable	damage	and	whether	 the	demining	quality	would	
be	affected.	
The	three	consecutive	manned	tests,	using	the	tiller	to	clear	live	
AT	mines,	 were	 carried	 out,	 without	 repair	 after	 each	 detonation.	
This	 was	 to	 find	 out	whether	 tiller,	 drive	 train	 and	 the	 quality	 of	
demining	were	still	acceptable.	Two	typical	examples	of	consecutive	
tests,	taken	from	the	German	Federal	Armed	Forces	Technical	Center	
for	Weapons	and	Ammunition’s	Final Report: MineWolf Clearing of 
Live Mines,3	are	described	below.
The	AT	mine	TM	62	P3	detonated	on-site	upon	contact	with	the	
mine-clearing	 device.	The	 hit	 occurred	 approximately	 0.5	metre	 (1.6	
feet)	off	the	left-hand	side	of	the	device.	
	Figure	7:	Damage	after	clearing	a	TM	62	P3	AT	mine.
2
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Damage	to	the	clearance	machine	included	
one	worn	chisel	and	two	bent	cross-spars	(the	
cross-spars,	 or	 strut	 braces,	 were	 deformed	
by	an	area	of	30	by	130	centimetres	[11.8	by	
51.2	inches]).	The	damage	seemed	to	be	mi-
nor	as	compared	to	the	previous	tests	with	the	
TM	57.	The	mine	crater	 in	the	ground	was	
of	normal	size.	The	machine	could	continue	
clearing	despite	the	damage	it	suffered.
	The	TM	57	also	detonated	on-site	upon	
contact	with	the	mine-clearing	device.	The	hit	
occurred	approximately	0.2	metre	(0.66	foot)	
off	the	right-hand	outer	edge	of	the	tiller.
Damage	 to	 the	 Minewolf	 included	 one	
outer	tooth	that	was	bent	outwards	and	four	
cross-spars	that	were	deformed	by	an	area	of	
30	by	130	centimetres	(11.8	by	51.2	inches).	
Two	 cross-spars	were	 torn	 off	 at	 the	 end	 of	
the	weld	seam.	The	depth-control	device	was	
bent	 outwards	 but	 still	 functioning.	 After	
some	provisional	work	lasting	about	15	min-
utes,	a	test	run	with	the	tiller	was	performed.	
The	tiller	performance	was	still	sufficient.	The	
mine-clearing	tool	and	drive	train	with	power	
bands	were	still	in	repairable	condition.	The	
clearing	quality	was	still	good	as	shown	by	the	
ground	appearance.	
Fragmentation Mine Tests with AP 
Mine DM 31 
Two	 contact	 detonations	 with	 AP	 frag-
mentation	 mine	 DM	 31	 were	 performed.	
The	 mines	 were	 placed	 on	 solid	 ground	
10	 metres	 and	 five	 metres	 (32.8	 and	 16.4	
feet)	 from	 the	 tiller	 on	 the	 left-hand	 (fully	
armoured)	side	of	the	mine-clearing	vehicle	
and	 the	mine	 fuze	DM	56A1B1	was	 initi-
ated	by	a	detonator	placed	on	top	of	it.	After	
approximately	 two	 seconds,	 the	 explosive	
device	of	the	mine	jumped	from	the	 launch	
box	and	detonated	about	one	metre	(3.3	feet)	
above	the	ground.
At	a	10-metre	(32.8-foot)	distance,	there	
were	only	a	few	fragment	hits	on	the	equip-
ment.	There	were	only	small	marks	on	the	six-
millimetre	 (0.24-inch)	 armour	 plates;	 there	
were	two	dents	in	the	three-millimetre	(0.12-
inch)	instrument	box,	one	hit	was	found	on	
the	 cabin	 glass.	 At	 a	 five-metre	 (16.4-foot)	
distance,	the	fragment	hits	were	more	severe:	
slight	dents	in	the	six-millimetre	(0.24-inch)	
armour	 plates.	 No	 fragment	 penetrations	
through	the	protected	operator	cab	were	de-
tected.	The	operability	of	the	MineWolf	was	
not	affected	by	the	fragment	hits.
Final Summary of Results
The	complete	and	final	 summary	of	 re-
sults	from	testing	is	taken	from	the	German	
Federal	Armed	Forces	Technical	Center	for	
Weapons	 and	 Ammunition’s	 Final	 Report:	
MineWolf	Clearing	of	Live	Mines.3
The	 mine-clearing	 MineWolf	 system	
with	both	accessory	devices	 is	 suitable	 for	
clearing	 live	 anti-tank	mines.	 The	 use	 of	
the	 flail	 device	 for	 clearing	 live	 anti-tank	
mines	 caused	 only	 minor	 damage	 that	
could	 be	 repaired	 with	 a	 limited	 effort	
or	 did	 not	 necessitate	 any	 repairs	 at	 all.	
The	use	of	the	tiller	against	live	anti-tank	
mines,	 however,	 resulted	 in	 considerably	
greater	 damage,	 which	 could	 only	 be	 re-
paired	 with	 a	 substantially	 greater	 effort	
than	 those	 caused	 with	 the	 flail.	 The	 re-
pairs,	mainly	welding	work,	could	be	per-
formed	on-site	that	same	day.	
The	 load	 on	 the	 operator	 by	 mine	
detonations	 is	 within	 the	 admissible	 and	
acceptable	 range.	 This	 finding	 is	 a	 result	
of	 the	 biomechanical	 evaluation	 of	 ATD	
dummy	measurements	and	through	ques-
tioning	of	the	three	operators.	It	applies	to	
the	examined	mine	types	DM	21,	TM	62	
and	TM	57	and	only	refers	to	mine	deto-
nations	that	occur	in	the	area	of	the	clear-
ing	device.
In	addition,	 taking	 into	account	 the	re-
sults	 achieved	 by	MineWolf	 during	 opera-
tions	 in	 Bosnia-Herzegovina,	 Croatia	 and	
southern	Sudan,	these	results	confirmed	that	
the	new	concept	 is	 the	basis	 for	developing	
the	demining	process	from	ground	prepara-
tion	to	mine	clearance	and	shows	improve-
ment	over	other	methods	and	systems	with	
regards	to	effectiveness,	quality	and	cost.
See Endnotes, page 112
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Figure	9:	The	operability	of	the	MineWolf	was	not	affected	by	fragment	hits	from	the	AP	fragmentation	mine	DM	31.
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